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ABSTRACT 
 
SARA DUDLEY: Regulating Food and Pharmaceuticals in the EU: A Comparison of 
Styles of Governance 
(Under the Direction of Dr. Gary Marks) 
 
 
The spread of Mad Cow disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) across Europe 
revealed critical flaws in European health regulation.  In 2000, the European Commission 
attempted to indulge public perception by establishing strong, proactive and coherent risk 
regulation policy, as set down in their 2000 Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle.  However, the Precautionary Principle does not apply to all industrial sectors 
equally.  This thesis compares food safety regulation to pharmaceutical regulation.  It 
clearly shows that each system of regulation is governed by a different mode or ‘style’.  
These different styles of governance predate the 2000 Communication but have also 
continued unchanged since then.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in Europe, 
many including the European Parliament criticized the handling of the epidemic by the 
Commission.  There was, and there remains, a strong fear that the next crisis could 
equally catch policymakers just as un-prepared.  Before the spread of BSE, most public 
health officials could not have foreseen that food for human consumption and feed for 
animal consumption might have such potentially devastating effects.  The next crisis 
could be equally as unpredictable.  In response to this fear, the critics of past policies 
wanted to create a ‘fortress-like’ regulatory institution.  They advocated for less 
fragmentary health policy regulation and one centralized regulatory agency, like the 
American version of the FDA, to enact concerted legislation for all sectors.1 
The 2000 Communication by the Commission on the use of the Precautionary 
Principle (PP) can be considered an embryonic step to presuppose at the very least a 
strong position on health regulation.  The Communication attempts to represent the 
collective preferences of European citizens as demanding a high level of protection. The 
Precautionary Principle (PP) is thus meant to establish a strong proactive stance in the 
face of scientific uncertainty during risk analysis.   
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 Lafond, François D. “L’Autorité Alimentaire européenne: enjeux institutionnels de la régulation des 
risques.” Paris: Notre Europe, 2001. 
 2 
Risk analysis involves three coordinated steps: risk evaluation or assessment, 
management, communication.   After performing a scientific evaluation where degrees of 
uncertainty are identified at each stage, the PP should frame the risk management phase.  
To quote the Communication:  “Judging what is an acceptable level of risk for society is 
an eminently political responsibility”.2  In other words, the PP arms the political decision-
maker with the legislative tool to conduct risk management. 
 This effort to underwrite a health policy that avoids the coexistence of divergent 
visions for different industrial sectors is belied by some internal contradictions.  The 
Communication is primarily focused on expanding the PP from environmental policy to 
food safety.  However, it also makes special mention of ‘a priori ‘dangerous goods, like 
drugs in the pharmaceutical sector. It argues that the system practiced by most developed 
countries for pre-market approvals “is one way of applying the PP”.3  
I would argue that the PP does not logically apply to the pharmaceutical sector.  
Drugs from the outset have been considered dangerous goods, which has fundamentally 
affected the evaluation of their risk and their management.  By likening the atypical 
process of risk assessment for food to the more standard process of pre-market approvals, 
it would appear that the Commission is attempting to obscure, or downplay, the 
exceptionally political nature of food safety regulation.  It presents a pretext of ‘business 
as usual’ by claiming that drug regulation is equally as ‘precautionary’.  The next logical 
conclusion would be, if it is standard practice for drugs, why not food?      
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 European Commission.  “Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle”.  COM 
2000 (1) final, pg. 3. 
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 Ibid., 20. 
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The motivations in making food safety similar to pharmaceutical regulation in the 
Communication are most likely diverse.  The PP has garnered critical international 
attention in the media, and through trade disputes arbitrated by the WTO.  The 
Communication can be seen to provide a defensive response in addition to concerted 
health policy.  The fact remains that the precise implications of the PP are undetermined 
and the principle remains substantially fluid.  An informed discussion by different parties, 
like the WTO and other national governments, can only be held if all sides at least 
acknowledge they are using different working definitions and agree on a common 
principle.  The 2000 Communication is an attempt on the Commission’s part to assert 
their definition.   
The different approaches in food safety regulation and pharmaceutical regulation 
will be further confirmed in considering the EU’s planned research for 2007-2013.  The 
7th Research and Development Framework process is an outline of strategies with regard 
to emerging biotechnologies.  The EU has gone to incredible lengths to define a 
European-wide ‘knowledge based Bio-economy’ in order to compete with the US, China 
and Japan.  From nanotechnology to cloning, some of the most interesting and lucrative 
science is being done in this field.  For our purposes, both food and pharmaceuticals stand 
to be radically changed by biotechnology.  Genetically modified foods or organisms 
(GMOs) and new bio-engineered drugs engender very different responses, in terms of 
research and institutional arrangements.  This subsequently affects their risk analysis.  If 
one takes a closer look at various EU position papers dealing with biotechnology, one 
will see some rhetorical back-pedaling on the Commission’s part about their support of 
the PP.  The language and terminology used are subtly different from those used in the 
 4 
2000 Communication.  This also further confirms that regulatory approaches and 
capabilities are remarkably divergent between the two sectors of food safety and drugs.     
The following sections will outline these differences by detailing the respective 
processes of risk evaluation and risk management for food products and pharmaceuticals.  
GMOs and bio-engineered drugs will be then used as case studies to illustrate how the 
general principles behind each respective form of regulation hold up with regards to more 
contentious and novel products.   I will then propose possible implications and draw some 
tentative conclusions about the status of health policy regulation in the EU.  
  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Food Safety Regulation 
History 
The BSE crisis provided the critical “triggering event” for policy innovation that 
has since paved the way for food safety health regulation. 4  In 1986, BSE, commonly 
known as mad cow disease, was identified as a possible disease to be found in cattle.  
One year later, the UK created a database to track the disease in livestock.  In 1988, 
ruminant-derived proteins found in livestock feed were identified as the infectious agent 
and as a result, the feed was banned for domestic consumption within the UK.  However, 
the contaminated feed was still exported to other countries.  Slaughter of infected cattle 
also became mandatory.  Farmers were compensated initially at 50% of their losses and 
then later at 100%.  The number of reports then jumped dramatically when compensation 
was increased, which provided circumstantial evidence of prior under-reporting.  Ten 
years later from the identification of BSE in cattle, a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
(vCJD), a neuro-degenerative disease, was reported in ten human cases.  By 2007, 160 
people had died of vCJD, and just over 183,000 cases of BSE had been reported in 
livestock in the UK alone.5  
                                                 
4
 Ansell, Christopher and David Vogel.  “The contested governance of European Food Safety” in What’s 
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 The National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease. "Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease", Edinburgh University, 
2007. 
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The scandal provoked by the BSE crisis was more than a simple reaction to the 
death count.  It was a function of the systematic breakdown of governance.  
Investigations became premised on detailing how much governing officials knew about 
the impact of the disease and when they knew it.  BSE infected livestock globally but 
European countries including the UK, France, Portugal and Spain received the brunt of 
the damages.  This therefore entailed not only a systematic breakdown of governance in 
Member States of the EU but also a severe malfunction at the supra-national level. 
The European Parliament as an institution has been the most vocal critic of those 
they consider responsible for the BSE crisis: namely, the European Commission and the 
Conservative British administration of the 80’s and 90’s.  In the case of the UK, the EP 
accused officials at the Scientific Veterinary Committee of acts tantamount to corruption.  
The investigatory report commissioned by the EP and led by MEP Ortega Medina laid 
these several accusations at the UK’s feet.6  To begin with, Medina pointed to evidence 
that clearly showed officials were worried about the existence of BSE and the spread of 
the infection through the livestock.  In 1988, this led to the feed being banned for use 
within the UK.  However, exports of the feed were increased to other countries at lower 
costs and could therefore be considered a case of trade dumping.  This increase in exports 
is also alleged to have spread the disease across the continent.  To be noted, the disease 
was supposed to have originated in Britain because of previous deregulations in the 
criteria for creating the feed.  British officials responded to the accusation of unethical 
activities by claiming that international trade regulations were a matter to be dealt with by 
the EU, then known as the European Community.  They claimed to have voluntarily 
                                                 
6
 European Parliament Temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE. “ Report on alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of Community law in relation to BSE”.  Rapporteur: Mr. Manuel 
Medina Ortega.  Document A4-0020/97, February 7th 1997. 
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written other countries warning about the possible deleterious effects of the feed while 
they maintained their exports.   
The British were also accused of mismanaging the tracking system for the 
containment of the disease.  Due to inadequate labeling restrictions, affected cattle were 
hard to track, and cross border trades exacerbated the infection.   
Finally, the British stood to be most guilty of neglecting consumer health by way 
of critical deregulations due to profit incentives.  At several junctures, British officials 
neglected to act proactively in the face of foreboding, albeit inconclusive evidence.  In 
the minds of the EP, scientific uncertainty was not a legitimate barrier to action, 
especially when potential consequences were irreversible, immediate and so severe.       
In terms of the Commission’s culpability, the EP charged them of not curbing the 
UK’s authority.  Chief UK Veterinary Officer, Mr. Keith Meldrum, reportedly stated that 
“Commission inspectors had no authority to investigate BSE matters…that BSE was not 
a technical but a political matter”.7  Mr. Meldrum’s comments implied that the 
Agriculture and Environment Commission had competence only in technical decisions.  
The Commission’s later justification of having “no suitable legal basis” to act supports 
that claim.8  Furthermore, the Commission is blamed for being influenced by a 
preponderant amount of British thinking.  Its BSE subgroup on the Scientific Veterinary 
Committee included an average of 4 British experts out of 9 members. The EP thus 
                                                 
7
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8
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accused the Committee of making a “partial and biased reading of the advice and 
warnings of scientists”.9   
In summary, the BSE crisis revealed very specific issues of governance for both 
the national and supra-national level:  a lack of inter-state communication and knowledge 
sharing, a grey zone of accountability between the national and supra-national levels, an 
opaqueness in decision-making, a biased collusion between experts and politicians 
without proper consideration of scientific opinion, and a reactionary versus proactive 
attitude to scientific uncertainty.  
The Precautionary Principle (PP) and the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) were both implemented to respond to these several issues.  In many ways, the PP 
and the EFSA are symbiotic and mutually reinforcing.  The following section will detail 
how during the initial step of risk evaluation, the EFSA delivers the preconditions for the 
risk management that the PP requires, as outlined in the 2000 Communication. 
  
Creating the right conditions: Risk Evaluation in the EFSA 
It became clear after the BSE crisis that it was necessary for the European polity 
to have an independent institution capable of providing risk assessment, in order to 
“enable Community institutions and Member States to take informed risk management 
decisions”.10   
There were several purposes behind moving decision-making from the 
Agriculture and Environment DG within the Commission to an external regulatory 
                                                 
9
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and requirements of food law, establishing the EFSA and laying down procedures in matters of food 
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agency.  Foremost in the minds of regulators was regaining the lost trust of consumers 
with regards to food safety.  This was started with the very clear assertion that issues of 
public health outweigh economic considerations.  This strategy has entailed a lot of 
rhetoric about civic participation in decision-making.  The 2000 Communication goes 
further, by claiming that the precursor step to risk assessment for food, the identification 
of a potential hazard, is consumer driven: “it may be for the user, a private individual, a 
consumer association, citizens or the public authorities to demonstrate the nature of a 
danger and the level of risk posed by a product or process”.11  We will see later how this 
premise of tailoring policy to consumer demands acts as an essential frame to the health 
regulation of the EU.    
 
Making Scientific Assessment Public 
The first step for inserting the public into deliberations is to make ‘room’ for 
them.  This entails making the process understandable and transparent for civic 
stakeholders.  In this way, they may begin to contemplate how to incorporate their own 
voices within the process.  The process of comitology was not well suited to the criteria 
of transparency, with its dense internal networks of committees and sub-working groups.  
Thus the EFSA currently chairs its own scientific review with several committees having 
clear portfolios.  Each committee is constituted of experts of various nationalities, where 
their positions are filled by open bids, their credentials and biographies are listed, and 
their vested interests are stated at the outset.  This is a clear response to the charge of 
preponderant power by one Member State.  The EFSA, while chairing its own 
committees, can be asked by the Commission to give a scientific opinion or to give 
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 European Commission. “2000 Communication”.  pg. 20.   
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assistance but only when “involving the application of well-established” practices.12  The 
EFSA is also in charge of commissioning studies with outside agencies, and is thus meant 
to act as the center of a network of national scientific bodies.  However, the fact remains, 
that even by 2005 the Commission still listed the required integration of the national and 
supra-national authorities as a future priority.13   
 The second step to ‘publicizing’ scientific decision-making is to create actual 
open communication between the EFSA, as the major Community institution, Member 
states, and individuals.  Communication with Member states involves the above-
mentioned networking with national authorities, which has the added benefit of 
harmonizing best practices and reducing barriers to trade.  As David Vogel and 
Christopher Ansell state, health regulation, especially in terms of food, remains one of the 
largest stumbling blocks to integration.  Communication with individuals is listed as a 
priority in the 2000 Communication. One of its core functions is within the third step of 
risk assessment, namely risk communication, which involves the rapid alert system 
during times of contamination.  The EFSA is also charged with disseminating “objective, 
reliable, and easily accessible information”.14 The format or mode of disseminating this 
information is left vague. 
 The EFSA’s criteria of transparency and open communication are perhaps 
misleading.  While they are conducting science publicly, in the way that their methods 
                                                 
12The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Regulation EC No 178/2002.  January 
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 European Commission.  “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee: Life Sciences and 
Biotechnology-A Strategy for Europe. Third Annual Progress Report and Future Orientations”.  COM 
(2005) 286 final/ SEC (2005) 850. 
 
14
 The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Regulation No 178/2002. Article 40. 
 11 
are understandable and the sources of their opinions are stated, this transparency does not 
invite active participation by citizens in the evaluation process.  Instead, they are 
preparing civic voices for participation for the second phase of risk assessment, risk 
management.  
If one remembers, for food products especially, the Commission claims to depend 
on consumers to identify potential hazards.  If consumers are included at the outset, it 
would be very difficult to shut them out of the process for the subsequent phases.  The 
EFSA’s objective is to allow consumers the privilege of ‘following along’. 
 The EFSA is also responsible for building up methodology for evaluating the 
risks involved with food safety.  As the safety of food is affected through the process of 
‘farm to fork’, the EFSA has a lot of catch-up work to do in order to be able to establish 
accepted testing methods for seeds, animal feed, as well as products for direct human 
consumption.  The EFSA is also in charge of implementing traceability requirements as 
outlined in Directive No 178/2002.  Traceability is essential for curtailing the spread of 
infection during crises, but is also a key element of coping with the GMO issue.  It means 
that farmers are held accountable for the type of materials they choose to use and 
consumers can also make informed choices.      
If one considers the entirety of the EFSA’s functions, one can begin to appreciate 
the institution as political tool for decision-making.  I reiterate the word ‘tool’ because the 
EFSA as an institution complements decision-making or risk management rather than 
substitutes or competes with it.  It provides scientific opinions, it collects data, and it even 
assembles minority opinions about divergent practices. It does not ever make binding 
decisions.  While there might be a desire for strengthened “links between risk assessors 
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and risk managers”, there remains a clear separation between the two practices. 15  Risk 
evaluation remains a technical process and an instrument for improving governance.  
Risk management, as we will now explore further, remains “an eminently political 
responsibility”.16        
 
Risk Management 
 As previously stated, the Precautionary Principle has been deemed by the 
Commission to be the unique policy tool in managing identified risks.  The fact remains 
however, that the PP is a fairly fluid concept and could easily have different implications 
for different participating institutions and organizations.  For the case of the environment, 
the application of the PP results in taking preventative positive action even when 
potential harmful effects  have been demonstrated, but not conclusively.  In the case of 
food safety legislation, it requires implementing restrictive measures even if no harm has 
been shown.  As the Communication states, the PP can involve taking the worst case 
scenario as its premise for action.  However, the potential consequence of presuming the 
worst case scenario is that “when such hypotheses are accumulated, this will lead to an 
exaggeration of the real risk.”17  The benefit of this position is that it “gives a certain 
assurance that it will not be underestimated”.18  
 The decision-making process as part of risk management involves the theoretical 
consideration of what in bio-tech terms is called the ‘innovation triangle’: comprised of 
                                                 
15The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Regulation No 178/2002. Premise #35 
 
16European Commission. “2000 Communication”. pg. 3. 
 
17
 Ibid., Annex III. 
 
18
 Ibid., Annex III. 
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science, society, and the economy. 19  The Commission clearly outlines that multiple 
perspectives must frame risk management:  “scientific assessment alone cannot…provide 
all the information”.20  This means that the empirical data that frames the quantification 
of scientific certitude is in turn interpreted by interested parties with qualitative concerns.  
The decision of how to act is not technocratic.  Jacques Delors when talking about food 
safety regulation on a European wide scale used the term “the culture of risk”.21 This is in 
line with the notion of collective preferences often spoken about by the Commission.  It 
involves a pre-supposition that the EU polity is uniform and consistent, and that it can be 
represented.   In this sense, the idea of protecting a people from risk no longer involves a 
mere scientific assessment.  It becomes another symbolic element meant to reinforce this 
act of representation at the supra-national level.   
There are several consequences in including the public during the initial risk 
management.  In general, risk assessment done prematurely during the scientific process, 
i.e. when a procedure or product has been identified as being new and as having potential 
effects but little else has been concluded, potential risks can be inflated.   As Olivier 
Godard puts it, preventative measures must be proportionate to both risks and potential 
benefits.  Furthermore, not all potential risks should be accorded the same weight and this 
too should affect the evaluation.  Godard calls this type of risk management apocalyptic 
and reasons that the lack of proportionate consideration of plausible possibilities could 
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 European Commission.  “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee: Life Sciences and 
Biotechnology-A Strategy for Europe. Third Annual Progress Report and Future Orientations”.  COM 
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 The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament.  “Regulation 172/2002”.  Premise 19. 
 
21
 Delors, Jacques. “Avant Propos”.  In La Creation de l’autorite Alimentaire Europeene by Francois 
Lafond.  2001.   
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lead to economic and political crises.  However, decision-makers are in a bind when it 
comes to instituting cautious health regulations and catering to the needs of the public.  
There has been a growing trend in public involvement leading to what can be termed the 
‘abstention rule’ or what essentially involves the eradication of all risk.22 This is 
understandably borne out of a lack of trust; trust that was lost during events like the BSE 
crisis.  A strong fear was tripped when an innocuous product had such ruinous effects.  
David Vogel names this ‘bind’ that decision-makers deal with another way: contested 
governance.  Contested governance is an event that transcends the typical policy conflict 
that most sectors face.  It is characterized by the deep and broad battle between 
stakeholders over the fundamental style of governance.  In the case of food regulation, 
the existence of a valid scientific methodology is not sufficient to ensure public safety.  
The public demands of government something more, an extra element of man made 
protection.  This is what the PP is meant to offer.     
 
The Case of Genetically Modified Foods 
Genetically Modified foods have been the source of a contentious trade debate 
between the EU and the US and Canada since the early nineties.  Historically, the 
American FDA decided to approach GMOs as roughly on par with more conventionally 
produced foods and did not require special legislation.   The EU, on the other hand, has 
consistently approached GMOs as a novel good and passed specific legislation dealing 
with it.  As Grace Skogstad claims, this very early distinction of ‘novel’ was in part due 
to the influence of environmental groups.  Furthermore, the DG responsible for the 
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en question”.  In Cahier # 2003-025.  Novembre 2003.   
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environment took over legislation in 1986.23  The Commission’s decision to authorize 
several types of bio-engineered maize resulted in several national Member States 
invoking the ‘safeguard clause’ and banning any imports.  In 1999, a de facto moratorium 
was placed on all genetically modified products and only eventually replaced with less 
stringent measures in 2003.  To date, GMOs in the EU are subject to compulsory 
traceability and packaging requirements, and a case-by-case approval process undertaken 
by the EFSA before they can be admitted into the market.      
The divide between the EU and North America is more obvious for GMOs simply 
because other areas of biotechnology have seen a growing trans-Atlantic collaboration.  
The EU has participated in the joint EU-US task force on biotechnology since June 1990, 
and has funded over one billion euros of research between the years 2003 and 2004 
alone.24 Three key projects that are being developed by the Commission include: the 
“NOFORISK” research project aimed at improving quantitative risk assessment methods 
to reduce scientific uncertainty, the “SAFEFOODERA” aimed at creating an open 
dialogue between producers and consumers, and the “SAFE FOODS” where new 
assessment criteria are created for new practices.  The titles alone of the projects are very 
much in line with the rhetoric of the PP in the 2000 Communication.  There seems to be a 
public relations aspect aimed at assuaging consumer fears but also with names like 
“NOFORISK” projecting a strategy of eradication of risk.   
 However, if one consults much of the literature that the Commission disseminates 
about bio-technology, the impetus for this type of restrictive regulation does not originate 
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 Skogstad, Grace. “Regulating Food Safety Risks in the European Union” In What is the Beef? Contested 
Governance edited by Christopher Ansell and David Vogel.   Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006.   
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 European Commission. “EC-US Task Force on Biotechnology”. < http://ec. 
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with them.25  The Commission, in concert with the Competitiveness in Biotechnology 
Advisory Group of Industry and Academia (CBAG), stresses that it is for Member States 
to implement the more stringent measures of traceability requirements and prior approval 
for GMO products.  The semantics involved are interesting, however.  The Commission 
was forced to regulate the industry with a pre-market type case-by-case approval of 
GMOs which is typically only done for a priori goods like pharmaceuticals.  The 
alternative was the over-regulation of the industry with individual ad-hoc Member-State 
bans.  Throughout the document, the Commission stresses the recalcitrant bargaining 
position of the Member States in Council and their inability to pass their own legislation 
through qualified majority voting.  The Report is essentially an admonishment to Member 
States arguing that they had better show greater willingness to collaborate.  The heart of 
their criticism lies in the fact that Member States “demanded” these measures and 
therefore “subsequently committed themselves to them”.26   
The language of the Report is also rhetorically dramatically different from the few 
occasions that GMOs are mentioned in the 2000 Communication on the PP.  Their right 
to impose ‘high levels of protection’ is not as eagerly stressed in the report.  The 
prerogative of safety is replaced by more economic appraisals of costs and benefits.  The 
Commission seems aware of the costs on a European scale of not competing with the US 
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 European Commission.  “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
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in this emerging market.  The benefits must accrue to individual Member States as they 
are the most active proselytizers for restrictive measures.   
The Commission also makes it very clear that they have taken into account 
popular opinion.  A 2006 Euro-Barometer makes it apparent that EU citizens do not greet 
GMOs in the same fashion as other forms of biotechnology.  However, the Euro-
barometer and the Report once again do not focus on protective regulatory measures.  As 
the Report on biotechnology states: “Recent public analysis clearly suggests that 
consumer’s reluctance towards GMOs is caused not so much by perceived risks rather 
than the lack of perceived benefits”.27  The use of the PP therefore seems inappropriate.  
The PP is labeled as a tool for consumer protection not an instrument to cater to 
consumer perception.  This makes one wonder whether it is appropriate to talk of 
European collective preferences for health and safety under the premise of a scientific 
regulatory system.  It would seem that economic and consumer considerations rather than 
ones of health are the larger issue.          
                                                 
27
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CHAPTER THREE 
 PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION  
 
History 
Drugs have historically been perceived as a unique good.  Drug regulation 
predates post-materialist concerns about the environment and certainly ones over food 
safety.  Their a priori distinction in the 2000 Communication differentiates it from other 
products like food products. The burden of proof is reversed.  Decision-makers assume 
that a product is hazardous until the opposite is shown.  This means that no public 
agitation is necessary to point out possible negative effects.  From the initial step, the 
identification of potential risks, the process of risk analysis is very different for 
pharmaceutical regulation.   
The perception of the deleterious effects of drugs crested significantly in both the 
US and the EU during the thalidomide crisis during the early 60’s.  Thalidomide was 
formulated by a German company and used extensively throughout Europe and the US to 
treat morning sickness in pregnant women.  Due to improper testing, its potential effects 
on the fetus were not discovered until tens of thousands of birth defects and possible 
abortive deaths resulted.28  Like in the case of BSE, the crisis demonstrated some clear 
breakdowns in governance.  It reminded the public about the risks involved in 
                                                 
28
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Pharmaceutical regulation.  New York: Manchester University Press, 2006.   
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pharmaceuticals.  Industrial self-regulation needed to be complemented by governmental 
intervention.  This resulted in the creation of regulatory agencies with government 
mandates to be theoretically independent of the pharmaceutical industry.  They were 
entrusted to maintain the balance between commercial interests and public health.  These 
agencies were required to check the efficacy, safety and quality of new drugs on the 
market. A regimented procedure was also put into place in order to verify a firm’s 
scientific investigations consistently and accurately.  The procedure followed as such: 
chemical and laboratory analysis, non-clinical pharmacology and animal toxicology, 
Phase I trials with health human volunteers, Phase II clinical trials with small numbers of 
patients, Phase III clinical trials with greater patient numbers, and Phase IV post-
marketing pharmacovigilance.29  The use of individual case studies and anecdotal 
evidence by physicians was replaced.  The use of clinical studies with larger survey 
populations allowed for statistical analysis and thus a more refined 
presentation/evaluation of the risks associated. 
 
Risk Evaluation: national regulating authorities and the role of the EMEA       
In the case of Europe, national authorities across the board developed very 
different approaches to pharmaceutical regulation.  Many of the national agencies tended 
to reflect the style of governance particular to any one country.  Germany, for instance, 
had a very paternalistic approach to regulation where the government felt it was its duty 
to impose strict restrictions on the industry.  In Britain, commercial interests played a 
larger role in shaping regulatory institutions and government and industry maintained 
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close contacts.  The process of drug licensing was therefore streamlined in order to 
maximize profit incentives.30 
However, as a European space opened up, the custom’s union allowed for cross-
border licensing of pharmaceuticals.   Two policy effects were triggered.  First, national 
authorities began to charge the pharmaceutical companies licensing fees in order to 
become self-sustaining.  This meant that agencies began to have to compete with other 
national authorities in order to attract evaluation and licensing contracts.  Models like the 
German case could not compete with more industrial friendly ones like the British 
agency.  Different national models therefore converged.  In countries like France, this 
meant that the Health Minister was no longer needed to even sign the approvals of new 
drugs.  This became tell-tale of a new mode of regulation.  Government was stepping 
aside in order to become more responsive to commercial interests. Thus, “[the] strictly 
scientific, [was] unburdened by economic considerations and protected from any 
discretionary intervention by official policymakers so as to guarantee its credibility”.31  
These independent regulatory agencies, comprised of experts, convening with 
industrialists, were now in charge of undertaking the three staged process of risk 
assessment.     
 The second effect involved the creation of the European Medical Evaluating 
Agency (EMEA). When the European space for market approvals opened up, the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Association took up office in London 
and Brussels to make the system work to their advantage.  This has fundamentally shaped 
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the EMEA.  The influential role of the pharmaceutical industry makes the EMEA’s initial 
claim that its creation was “firstly a benefit for the European patient” unlikely.32  The fact 
remains that approval systems needed to be improved as drug registrations slowed down, 
applications were increasing, and the requisite knowledge for decision-making became 
more scientific and technical.33  The EMEA’s priorities were to remedy these specific 
problems at the request of the pharmaceutical industry.   
The EMEA was thus designed to act as an arbiter between competing national 
agencies.  The process of European wide licensing currently requires one host Member 
country to evaluate a new drug, then a second Member State to either support or reject an 
approval in their country.  If the second Member-State supports the approval, the drug 
can be marketed across the Union.  If the second Member State rejects the approval then 
the EMEA appoints a third rapporteur Member State (unofficially the pharmaceutical 
client gets to choose) to arbitrate between the divergent opinions.  Similar to the EFSA, 
the EMEA has the effect of harmonizing practices between Member States.  No Member 
State wants to be identified as having radically divergent practices or gain the reputation 
of being overtly difficult.  Unlike the EFSA, the EMEA can make binding decisions and 
this cuts down on time taken for litigation.   This also means that the decision-making 
style of close collaboration between experts and industrialists is preserved on the supra-
national level.       
The evaluation process is greatly framed by the notion of ‘burden of proof’. The a  
priori distinction means that over time a sophisticated procedure for testing 
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pharmaceuticals has evolved.  There is a very clear and well established regiment for 
proving a drug’s safety and efficacy.  If we recall, methodologies for testing food 
products, or non a priori goods, are still inchoate.  The EFSA is charged with solidifying 
these methods presently.  However, as public perception plays a key role, products like 
GMOs can later be called on to prove that their goods are not dangerous.  This belated 
burden of proof forces them to undertake voluntary research or wait on the EFSA and 
their network of labs to catch-up.  Therefore, a priori goods benefit oddly from their 
categorization as they are much better prepared to handle their own burden.  They have a 
clear institutional road-map to follow, and can benefit from experts who have 
standardized means of testing.  Furthermore, this burden of proof quickly shifts in the 
European market once one Member state gives its approval. Once the product is approved 
in one state, the second state must collect a large amount of data to be able to support a 
rejection.   
Of course, profit margins further aid pharmaceutical companies to meet their 
charge.  Ten years can pass between a discovery and licensing, with upwards of billions 
of dollars being spent to fund the necessary research.  The cost of the entire testing phase 
and the loss of potential revenue from delays put extreme pressure on regulating agencies 
to cut down their times of approvals.  Putting a new drug on the market is therefore quite 
risky, there always being a chance of rejection and wasted time and resources.  However, 
the huge profit margins after hitting the market are the best incentive to force this kind of 
extensive preparatory groundwork.  Beef importers and farmers are by no means small 
industries.  They also mobilize a great number of resources and they have close links with 
government support.  However, they do not enjoy the same economies of scale as 
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pharmaceutical industries.  Their profit margins lack the hyperbole necessary to 
recuperate those types of prohibitive costs. 
 
Risk Management 
To begin with, the separation between assessors and managers does not exist in 
the same way as those who regulate food safety.  Pharmaceutical regulation is a closed 
loop that does not ever devolve to the Commission or national health ministries.  
Furthermore, the public is not included at the outset of the process nor are they ever given 
the chance to become involved later.  The risk evaluation involves pharmaceutical 
companies bringing their own data to independent authorities and meeting with experts.  
Their sophisticated data facilitates the risk management phase, perhaps constraining the 
anarchical element of scientific uncertainty to a more appreciable quantitative 
assessment.  More importantly, however, the process allows for a close collaboration of 
experts and industry to decide what becomes a more technocratic and less political 
decision.   
  This close collaboration is part of the trend termed ‘the privatization of science’.  
This phenomenon is the exact opposite of the concurrent trend for food safety to 
publicize science.  Perhaps as the thalidomide crisis is much older than the BSE crisis, 
government is less interested in regaining public trust in terms of pharmaceuticals.  
Furthermore, the thalidomide crisis predated the political emergence of the EU.  Thus the 
supranational level did not have to be accountable to the public.  This lack of public 
responsiveness continues to date. 
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The pharmaceutical industry’s ability to innovate has led to what are now called 
‘blockbuster drugs’, i.e. drugs like Lipitor or Viagra.  People have become accustomed to 
powerful medications improving a wide variety of ailments.  Drug companies have in 
return seen their profit margins explode.  This profit incentive has led to a stakeholder 
attitude towards knowledge where Intellectual Property restricts the access of 
information.  This has led to research institutions either being performed by universities 
under strict confidentiality agreements or private research facilities becoming more 
prominent.  Pharmaceutical companies have become the ‘owners’ of their data.  This 
entails them being given the ability to select what materials they want published and/or 
patenting their discoveries so that others must pay to use their methods and products.  
Perhaps indicative of the lucrative nature of Intellectual Property and its importance for 
medicines, the European Patent Office is the only regulatory institution other than the 
EMEA to be able to make binding decisions.   
      If we consider this institutional arrangement and the process of risk evaluation and 
risk management, where exactly does the PP come into play in terms of pharmaceutical 
regulation?  Perhaps, the best term used to describe the sphere of pharmaceutical 
regulation has been ‘entrepreneurial politics’.34  When regulating agencies compete with 
each other for self-sustaining fees, corporate attitudes transform applicant companies into 
consumers. To be noted, the EMEA derives the majority of its financing from fees as 
compared to the 15 % of the FDA derived from industry.35  This has led to what the head 
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of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations calls a 
“partnership” whereby it is “not a case of the regulator versus the regulated”.36 
 
The case of innovative medicines and bio-engineered drugs 
In its most basic form genetically engineered drugs have become a staple in health 
care provision since 1982.  Insulin for treatment of patients suffering from diabetes was 
originally animal derived, however, the technology of bio-engineering allowed for 
synthetic versions to replace porcine ones.  Presently, slightly less quotidian uses for bio-
engineered drugs are slated for either continued research or even approval.  Bio-
pharmaceuticals, involving larger molecules of proteins, are being studied for targeting 
underlying mechanisms of diseases.  Bio-engineered micro-organisms like modified 
versions of E.coli are also being tested for sources of antibiotics and insulin.  The bio-
drug Herceptin is the first of its kind with matching diagnostic tests to profile the genetic 
makeup of patients to be approved.  The fact remains that more novel applications for 
bio-pharmaceuticals are set to be explored and implemented.   
 The Commission has begun to use the Lisbon Employment Strategy to 
frame their arguments pro-biotechnology.  They claim there is a “recognized need” for 
bio-technology to help them reach their targeted goals of “economic growth, sustainable 
development and environmental preservation”.37  With this aim in mind, the 7th R&D 
Framework has initiated several projects to facilitate research.  The entire Framework has 
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a budget of 50 billion euros for the year 2007 through to 2013.38  The perceived need for 
these strategies was great enough that the 7th Framework received a 150% increase from 
the budget of the 6th Framework.   
Due to the constraints placed on GMOs by Member States, the 7th Framework 
focuses largely on improving research and production in the pharmaceutical industry.  
The 7th Framework outlines two distinct approaches.  The first one involves introducing a 
type of “risk-sharing finance facility”.39 In layman’s terms this means a funding project 
undertaken by both private and public stakeholders.  The project, termed the Joint 
Technology Initiative on Innovative Medicines (IMI JTI), will be co-funded by the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Association and is meant to 
“reinvigorate the industry”.40  The implications of this co-financing involve reinforcing 
the relationship between regulators and those who are regulated.  Once again, the 
governing style is entrepreneurial politics.  Costs and revenue dictate a type of 
relationship that is not conducive towards public participation.  The gaps between 
regulators and industry are being tightened, not widened by civic participation.   
This proclivity towards industry is confirmed by the second goal.  The 
Commission, along with the Competitiveness in Biotechnology Advisory Group 
(CBAG), is advising that regulators need to streamline the approval process.  
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Deregulation is outlined as a major priority, in order to remove barriers to competition for 
Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs).  The 7th Framework is meant to focus on ways that 
the EMEA can become less costly, more efficient, and give faster approval times: “It 
should ensure the maximum utilization of research results and data, and rapid uptake into 
industrial, clinical and regulatory practice.”41  The Commission includes the note that 
faster approval times will also benefit European patients in terms of better access to 
medicines.  However, the fact that the entire project is framed by the Lisbon Agenda 
means that ways for improving competitiveness are meant to be the main priorities.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION 
I would like to frame this concluding section with one initial personal impression.  
Over the course of studying both food and pharmaceutical regulation within the EU, it 
seems remarkable that the two are very rarely discussed together in the lengths of journal 
articles, books, or legislative/government documents.  This is not the case for the 
American situation where both types of regulatory capabilities are routinely discussed 
within the framework of the Food and Drug Administration.  For the European 
geopolitical space, the academic and theoretical tendency to separate the two seems 
logical.   
As this thesis shows, the two sectors engender different stakeholder attitudes and 
institutional responses.  The regulation of food safety is very much oriented towards the 
public.  Its criteria for openness and transparency in order to facilitate democratic civic 
participation means that regulators are required to flex their political muscles.  They 
cannot engage in technocratic, elitist, and opaque decision-making.  The EFSA reflects 
this type of governance style.  Pharmaceutical regulation has purposefully evaded this 
type of civic activity.  National regulating authorities and the EMEA have endeavored to 
maintain close connections with the pharmaceutical industry.  The fact that national 
regulating agencies collect licensing fees from pharmaceutical companies means that this 
type of governance style can accurately be termed ‘entrepreneurial politics’.   
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These differences in styles have meant that academics, bureaucrats, and politicians tend 
to deal with each system of regulation as being separate.  The trend towards separating 
the two makes the 2000 Communication’s attempt to link them singular and note-worthy.   
Perhaps we need consider the historical context of the Communication of seven 
years ago to better understand its underlying motivations. Periodicals describe how it was 
politically advantageous for European officials, for example Romano Prodi as 
Commission President, to promise strong, proactive, and concerted health regulation.  
The 2000 Communication could be therefore considered to have been a road-map or a 
declaration of intentions on the part of the EU Commission.  However, the rhetoric of 
political promise is belied by the fact that the two regulatory schemes were on two 
different strategic tracks.  While both were meant to meld the fields of science and policy, 
one has led to the ‘publicization’ of science and the other the privatization.  The 2000 
Communication at no point interrupted this divergence.  It in fact encouraged the split by 
creating the legal wherewithal to open the debate for food safety, and failing to do so for 
pharmaceutical regulation.      
 By way of the two case studies, bio-technology seemingly exposes the root of a 
contradictory health regulatory policy.  Clearly, divergent visions for different sectors 
exist.  It makes one question what is the problematic part of biotechnology: the process or 
the product?  Clearly, the process is heralded as being potentially lucrative and 
advantageous.  However, it is not simple enough to say the product is the problem either.  
A cold empirical and scientific analysis has not alluded to any negative side effects for 
GMOs, as of yet.  A cultural factor, where ‘collective’ preferences are constantly referred 
to, is at play.  Furthermore, the language of legislation for GMOs has a cost vs. benefit 
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component.  The economic terms certainly detract from the scientific aspects of risk 
analysis.  Within trinity of stakeholders, society, the economy and science, who is the 
protagonist and who is the bit player?  It is tempting to say that the economy wins out.  
As the Third Annual report states, it is about consumer perception and not protection.  
The lack of clear benefits is more salient than the existence of potential risks.  It is 
appropriate to question whether the PP is just a guise to do a cost vs. benefit analysis 
without tripping the ‘protectionist’ flag.   
For pharmaceuticals, the opposite can be said.  The industry, including the 
emerging biotechnology contingent, is rapidly growing and one of its main supporters is 
the Commission.  As during the initial creation of the EMEA, this rapid growth cannot 
come at the price of appearing to forsake consumer protection.  However, ties between 
industry and government are quickly becoming closer, and are doing so at the behest of 
ambitious and well-funded research strategies. It is clear that the societal stakeholders do 
not have an overriding influence. 
An interesting implication to this debate over EU health regulation is the future of 
the biotechnology field.  I would contest the assertion that “the European dispute over 
GM foods may establish a precedent for how societies will debate and regulate novel 
technologies that present complex ethical and scientific questions”.42  The presently 
divergent practices give a prescient indicator that one cannot generalize about emerging 
biotechnologies and, secondly, that these two sectors do not seem likely to ever converge.  
Furthermore, these practices are institutionally enshrined and, in the absence of another 
great policy ‘triggering’ event, are unlikely to change.   
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Finally, we are left with the matter of the PP.  The ability of the Commission to 
promulgate its use of the Precautionary Principle is a source of contention.  Its degree of 
success as a domestic PR tactic to assuage the citizenry of their ‘high level of protection’ 
has not been studied.  Certainly, the millennium cry for a fortress-Health Europe has not 
been met.  Whether any regret that fact presently also remains to be studied.  Whether the 
2000 Communication meant to seriously link together the divergent sectors of food safety 
and pharmaceutical regulation is also unknown.  Clearly, international audiences are not 
convinced about the appropriateness of the PP as a legislative tool.  With this in mind, the 
PP as a policy approach has not created strong concerted health policy.   
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